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Abstract Questions related to the uniqueness of language can
only be addressed properly by referring to sound knowledge
of the relevant cognitive abilities of nonhuman animals. A key
question concerns the nature and extent of animal rule-
learning abilities. I discuss two approaches used to assess
these abilities. One is comparing the structures of animal vo-
calizations to linguistic ones, and another is addressing the
grammatical rule- and pattern-learning abilities of animals
through experiments using artificial grammars. Neither of
these approaches has so far provided unambiguous evidence
of advanced animal abilities. However, when we consider
how animal vocalizations are analyzed, the types of stimuli
and tasks that are used in artificial grammar learning experi-
ments, the limited number of species examined, and the
groups to which these belong, I argue that the currently avail-
able evidence is insufficient to arrive at firm conclusions
concerning the limitations of animal grammatical abilities.
As a consequence, the gap between human linguistic rule-
learning abilities and those of nonhuman animals may be
smaller and less clear than is currently assumed. This means
that it is still an open question whether a difference in the rule-
learning and rule abstraction abilities between animals and
humans played the key role in the evolution of language.
Keywords Language evolution . Artificial grammar
learning . Comparative cognition .Animal cognition .Animal
vocalizations
The complexity of human language structure has given
rise to fundamental questions regarding the nature and
evolutionary origin of this complexity: To what extent
does language structure deviate from the vocal communi-
cation signals of nonhuman animals? Are the computa-
tional and learning mechanisms that guide learning about
language structure specific to language or to humans?
These questions have in common that addressing them
requires adequate knowledge of the relevant abilities of
nonhuman animals. Studies on these abilities have used
various approaches. One is to focus on the production of
species-specific vocalizations, to compare the syntax of
animal vocalizations with that of language. Another is to
focus on perceptual and processing abilities more gener-
ally, through experiments on Bartificial grammar learning^
(AGL) that assess what types of patterns or grammar rules
animals can detect in artificially prepared string sets. The
value of comparative studies for shedding light on the
uniqueness and possible origins of language structure is
widely acknowledged, but I will argue that we are still
only scratching the surface of the relevant cognitive abil-
ities of animals.
The structure of animal vocalizations
The vocalizations of the closest living relatives of humans, the
great apes, are quite unlike those of humans. Their repertoire
is limited and does not result from vocal learning, and most
vocalizations do not consist of longer sequences of discrete
sounds. So, if one is interested in understanding how the struc-
tural complexity of language may have arisen, studying great
ape vocalizations does not provide the most useful model.
However, other animal species have rich, learned, and more
varied vocalizations—in particular, songbirds and cetaceans
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(dolphins and whales). Their variability has made these vocal-
izations a prime target for formal analyses of their underlying
structures, often using the Chomsky hierarchy as a yard-
stick to measure the complexity of animal vocalizations
(e.g., Berwick, Okanoya, Beckers, & Bolhuis, 2011). This
has revealed that although the songs of a nightingale
(Luscinia megarhynchos) or a humpback whale
(Megaptera novaeangliae) are more complex than the
first- or second-order Markov chains with which the first
researchers described birdsong structures (reviewed by ten
Cate, Lachlan, & Zuidema, 2013), the structure of many
animal vocalizations can be described by such algorithms
as probabilistic or hidden Markov models (Berwick et al.,
2011; Hurford, 2012; ten Cate et al., 2013; ten Cate &
Okanoya, 2012), Bstate chain^ processes (Hurford, 2012),
or Brenewal processes^ (Kershenbaum et al., 2014).
However, all of these processes belong to a lower level
of the hierarchy than the context-free grammars needed
for a formal description that could produce the recursive
patterns characteristic of human language (Berwick et al.,
2011; Hurford, 2012). One may draw the conclusion that
this sufficiently demonstrates the presence of a fundamen-
tal gap between language and animal vocalizations, but
this conclusion may be drawn too quickly. To fully cap-
ture the features of complex vocalizations such as the
song of a nightingale, with different levels of organization
(elements within subsections of songs; subsections within
a song; and songs within a string of songs), may require
models that include one or more submodels describing the
organization of a different, lower level, creating a hierar-
chical structure. Several authors have suggested that such
models may reduce the gap between human and animal
linguistic abilities (Hurford, 2012; Kershenbaum et al.,
2014; ten Cate et al., 2013). Also, although they may
not capture the complexity present in lexical syntax, they
might have a level of complexity comparable to models
for human morphosyntax (Samuels, 2015). At the same
time, the vocalizations of many species still need to be
explored. In doing so, we may discover species with vo-
calizations that will further narrow the current gap.
Language as cognitive process
Although studying the structural regularities in the vocal-
izations of nonhuman animals can be informative, we may
question whether this could ever yield the full or most
useful insights into the roots of linguistic structures. To
understand why, we should look at the lively debate
concerning the uniqueness of language. On one side of
the spectrum, we find those who argue that human language
is based on the evolution of a special, innate language faculty,
consisting of some uniquely human computational abilities
(Buniversal grammar^)—in particular, the use of recursive
structures (e.g., Everaert, Huybregts, Chomsky, Berwick, &
Bolhuis, 2015). Proponents of this view argue that language
did not evolve for communication, but instead reflects ad-
vanced and uniquely human cognitive abilities that evolved
primarily as instruments for thought and combining informa-
tion (e.g., Berwick & Chomsky, 2015). On the other side of
the spectrum, we find those who argue that language is Busage
based^ (Tomasello, 2003) and evolved from domain- and
species-general computational mechanisms, with humans
having more advanced computational mechanisms (e.g.,
Christiansen & Chater, 2015). Proponents of this view also
argue that these cognitive mechanisms evolved prior to lan-
guage and subsequently made language possible. These op-
posing views concerning the uniqueness of the mechanisms
underlying language development and their evolution both
refer to animal studies to support their cases, either by arguing
that the current animal studies show no evidence of the cog-
nitive mechanisms required for linguistic syntax (e.g.,
Watumull, Hauser, & Berwick, 2014) or by arguing that the
cognitive mechanisms of nonhuman animals provided the ba-
sis for the more advanced ones present in humans (e.g.,
Christiansen & Chater, 2015). Thus, if the roots of language
are to be found in cognitive mechanisms that did not primarily
evolve for communication, we should look beyond the struc-
ture or processing of species-specific vocalizations. Instead,
the computational and rule-learning abilities of nonhuman an-
imals in general, and how these compare to those of humans,
take center stage in the debate about the uniqueness of human
language. So, what do we know about these topics?
Animal artificial grammar learning
If human computational abilities have their origin outside the
domain of language, there is no need to restrict comparative
studies to animal species that show elaborate vocalizations or
vocal learning. Also, studying how visual patterns are proc-
essed may be equally as informative, in terms of the abilities
for pattern detection and rule learning, as studying auditory
processing. Such studies have demonstrated that processes
like categorization and concept formation, which are also es-
sential for language processing, can be found in a range of
nonhuman animals (e.g., Zentall & Wasserman, 2012).
Comparative studies have also demonstrated that various an-
imals can use ordinal as well as transitional information to
learn about linear strings of items (e.g., Chen & ten Cate,
2015; Orlov, Amit, Yakovlev, Zohary, & Hochstein, 2006),
and that some species can detect nonadjacent relations among
items (e.g., Sonnweber, Ravignani, & Fitch, 2015).
The abilities to process more abstract or higher-order rela-
tionships among items are more explicitly tested in AGL ex-
periments, in which arbitrary, meaningless auditory or visual
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items are presented to subjects in strings arranged according to
particular grammatical rules that define the sequences of, or
the relations between, particular items. Next, subjects are test-
ed for whether and what they learn about the underlying struc-
tures. This method has proven very successful for analyzing
and understanding the rule-learning mechanisms and their
constraints in human adults and infants, and increasingly it
is being used to address the sequence-learning abilities of
nonhuman animals (Fitch & Friederici, 2012). Studies of in-
fants are often based on a familiarization paradigm, in which
they are exposed to a string of sounds organized according to
one particular algorithm. After hearing this for some time,
resulting in a decline of interest in the sounds, the infants hear
test sounds organized according to either the familiarized or a
deviating structure. A difference in attending to the familiar
and deviant-structured strings (measured by behavioral or
neural responses) indicates that the infants have detected a
difference between the two structures (e.g., Marcus, Vijayan,
Rao, & Vishton, 1999). The familiarization method has been
and is being used to test several animal species, in particular
various monkey species (e.g., Hauser & Glynn, 2009). A sec-
ond frequently used method, especially for animal testing, is
to use operant conditioning to train animals to discriminate
sets of strings organized according to a different algorithm.
Making the distinction already indicates that the animals are
able to detect a difference in structure. But, as has been noted
for rule learning in humans (e.g., Aslin & Newport, 2014;
Gerken, 2006; Kovacs, 2014), sets of strings can be discrim-
inated in many ways, ranging from rote memorization of dif-
ferent strings to deriving the abstract rule underlying a set.
Subsequent probe trials using novel, nonreinforced, different-
ly structured strings are needed to test various hypotheses as to
what exactly has been learned about the training sets (e.g.,
Ravignani, Westphal-Fitch, Aust, Schlumpp, & Fitch, 2015;
van Heijningen, Chen, van Laatum, van der Hulst, & ten Cate,
2013). Both familiarization and discrimination tasks have
their pros and cons (see ten Cate & Okanoya, 2012, for a
discussion) but can be used to address similar questions.
Because both types of studies can provide complementary
information, combining them might be useful, but this is
something still to be exploited.
In principle, AGL experiments on rats and vocal-
nonlearning birds like pigeons can be just as informative,
regarding animal rule-learning abilities, as those focused
on primates or vocal-learning songbirds, as several studies
have demonstrated. Pigeons (Columba livia), for instance,
could learn to discriminate two different artificial finite
state grammars consisting of strings of colored letters,
and could generalize this discrimination to novel strings
(Herbranson & Shimp, 2008), and rats (Rattus norvegicus)
could detect regularities in a task in which they had to press
levers in a hierarchically organized sequence (Fountain et al.,
2012). However, the elaborate vocal patterns in the songs of
many songbirds and their abilities to learn such patterns might
make this group a particularly promising one to find more
elaborate abilities for processing and learning of auditory pat-
terns. If one’s interest is in an animal model as a comparison to
study the neural mechanisms underlying such processing, then
primates may provide the best entry. For instance, Wilson
et al. (2015) used fMRI to examine the brain regions involved
in processing a forward-branching artificial finite state gram-
mar in both rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) and humans.
They found counterparts in the monkey brain for regions in
both the human ventral frontal and opercular cortices that are
associated with the initial stages of human syntax processing.
These results hint at the possibility that regions that cur-
rently play a significant role in language function may
have had their origin in more domain-general sequence-
processing regions that may have also been present in our
ancestors (Wilson et al., 2015).
Can animals learn rules?
Several AGL studies have addressed whether animals can
learn more abstract rules, such as detecting the regularity in
strings of arbitrary sound items arranged in an (AB)n or AnBn
pattern (A and B indicating sounds belonging to two different
categories). The second pattern requires the animal to keep
track of the number of As to assess whether the proper number
of B items is present, which is not required for keeping track
of the AB alternation in the first pattern and crosses the border
of what a finite state grammar can deal with. Whereas humans
succeeded in detecting both patterns, tamarins (Saguinis
oedipus) could only detect the first one (Fitch & Hauser,
2004). Subsequent studies on starlings (Sturnus vulgaris;
Gentner, Fenn, Margoliash, & Nusbaum, 2006) and zebra
finches (Taeniopgia guttata; van Heijningen, de Visser,
Zuidema, & ten Cate, 2009) showed that both species were
able to distinguish (AB)n from AnBn strings. Although this
might suggest that they had learned the rules underlying the
string sets, demonstrating true rule abstraction would require
two conditions to be met: (1) maintaining the distinction when
sounds belonging to other categories than the A and B training
categories were used, and (2) correct classification of probe
strings with items arranged in sequences that either did or did
not fit the specific algorithms of the training strings. Further
tests of the zebra finches showed that only one individual
transferred the distinction to sounds from novel categories
(C and D). This suggests that, for most birds, the original
discrimination might have been based on generalization of
specific phonetic features of the A and B items, rather than
on abstracting the pattern. In addition, probe tests with other
string types revealed that the birds discriminated the strings by
attending to local regularities in the strings, such as the pres-
ence of AA bigrams (which are only present in AnBn strings),
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rather than by attending to the overall structure. These dis-
crimination strategies differed between individuals (van
Heijningen et al., 2009), demonstrating the importance of an-
alyzing the responses to probe strings at the individual level.
The starlings were not tested with sound items belonging to
novel categories, nor did the researchers examine how indi-
vidual birds discriminated the strings. So, although birds may
have the ability to detect higher-order string regularities, this
was not unambiguously demonstrated by these experiments.
Similar experiments with pigeons and keas (Nestor notabilis),
using strings of visual items, showed that these species also
based discriminations between the two string types on the
presence or absence of local regularities, rather than on the
global string structure. Interestingly, the keas all used the same
feature to discriminate between the string types (attending to
the presence of a BA transition), whereas the pigeons showed
individual differences and no consistent pattern in which fea-
tures they used (Ravignani et al., 2015; Stobbe, Westphal-
Fitch, Aust, & Fitch, 2012).
Another series of experiments were inspired by a seminal
study by Marcus et al. (1999), in which 7-month-old infants
were habituated to XYX or XYY strings (with X and Y being
speech syllables, resulting in strings like Bgatiga^ or Bgatiti^).
Afterward, the infants’ responses to novel strings showed that
they had extracted the underlying regularity and generalized it
to stimuli composed of novel syllables. The seemingly simple
task of discriminating XYX and XXY structures lends itself
very well to comparing how humans and various animal spe-
cies do this. A number of species have been tested on their
abilities to detect this pattern, in both habituation and
discrimination tasks, including rhesus macaques (Hauser
& Glynn, 2009), rats (Murphy, Mondragón, & Murphy,
2008), Bengalese finches (Lonchura striata domestica;
Seki, Suzuki, Osawa, & Okanoya, 2013), zebra finches
(Chen, van Rossum, & ten Cate, 2015; Spierings & ten
Cate, 2016; van Heijningen et al., 2013), and budgerigars
(Melopsittacus undulates; Spierings & ten Cate, 2016). As
with the previous example, these species also distin-
guished the string types. Some studies claimed to have
demonstrated rule abstraction by showing that novel stim-
uli were responded to appropriately (e.g., Murphy et al.,
2008). But here, too, the claims for rule learning have
been contested by suggesting that various results can be
explained by lower-level similarities between the training
and test strings (e.g., Corballis, 2009). So, the questions
above can be raised here as well: Is there transfer of the
discrimination to sounds that do not match the training
sounds phonologically, and what Brule^ do the animals
use (see also ten Cate, 2014; ten Cate & Okanoya, 2012)?
The ability to transfer a discrimination to strings consisting
of novel sounds has been tested systematically in one recent
experiment. Both zebra finches and budgerigars were first
trained to discriminate a set of XYX from XXY strings, and
next were tested with strings consisting of novel arrangements
of familiar items and strings consisting of items belonging to
novel sound categories that had no acoustical similarity to the
training sounds, but only shared the string structure (Spierings
& ten Cate, 2016). The results were remarkable. The zebra
finches did not differentiate between the XYX and XXY
strings consisting of novel items. However, strings consisting
of novel arrangements of the familiar items were differentiat-
ed, albeit not by their underlying structure, but by the ordinal
positions of the individual items. The zebra finches seemed to
have memorized the positions of the separate items in all
training stimuli and judged new strings by their similarity to
the training strings with respect to item position. Earlier ex-
periments had also indicated that zebra finches attend to spe-
cific parts of training strings and use these to classify novel
arrangements of stimuli (Chen et al., 2015; van Heijningen
et al., 2013). In contrast, budgerigars exposed to the same
strings behaved quite differently. They did attend to the ab-
stract structural similarity of the training and test strings, sim-
ilar to the infants in the experiments of Marcus et al. (1999).
Whether the difference between the two bird species is related
to other cognitive abilities awaits further investigation. In any
case, although these species showed a fundamental difference
in the strategies they used to discriminate the training stimuli,
both strategies were effective for discriminating the training
stimuli correctly.
An unbridgeable gap?
Interestingly, whereas studies using XYX and XXY strings
have shown that human infants and adults readily generalize
to phonetically novel items, there is also evidence that if the
stimulus sets used can be distinguished using local pattern
similarities, humans prefer to do so. Infants exposed to XXY
strings in which the Y items were the same for all training
strings used this Y item as a cue to classify the strings, and
used the overall structural pattern only when no such similar-
ity was present (Gerken, 2006). Also, both human infants
(Kovacs, 2014) and adults (Chen et al., 2015) are more in-
clined to classify strings on the basis of the presence of item
repetition (e.g., XX), if possible, than to base comparisons on
all three items. So, in contrast to what seems to be a common
assumption when comparing human and animal computation-
al abilities, and despite the presence of human Bdendrophilia^
(a sensitivity to higher-order structure; Fitch, 2014), humans
do not always use higher-order regularity as a default strategy;
sometimes they also rely on lower-level or specific local reg-
ularities, similar to the strategies used by nonhuman animals.
And if humans can apply different strategies, depending on
the context, why not animals? Although animal species may
have attended to lower-level regularities as a default, in some
cases they may have been able to use higher-level ones, if
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necessary. Hence, the gap between the inferred default for
humans to use higher-order strategies and for animals to use
lower ones may be smaller than is sometimes claimed (e.g.,
Watumull et al., 2014).
To summarize, it is fair to say that the evidence for several
claims of animals being able to attend to higher-order regular-
ities in strings, ranging from baboons (Papio papio; Rey,
Perruchet, & Fagot, 2012) and rats (Murphy et al., 2008), to
starlings (Gentner et al., 2006) and Bengalese finches (Abe &
Watanabe, 2011), is at best ambiguous (e.g., Beckers, Bolhuis,
Okanoya, & Berwick, 2012; Corballis, 2009; Poletiek, Fitz, &
Bocanegra, 2016; van Heijningen et al., 2009). Nevertheless,
although the findings can be explained by the use of simpler
strategies, this does not imply that animals are unable to use
higher-order ones. Animals’ real potential for rule learning
may not have been revealed by the current experiments; the
challenge for researchers will be to create better experiments
to test these abilities. At the same time, it is clear that species
(and also individuals) tested with the same stimuli can differ in
their default strategies for assessing the regularities among
strings. This was shown by the pigeons and keas tested by
Ravignani et al. (2015), and by the zebra finches and budger-
igars discussed above (Spierings & ten Cate, 2016). Because
only a handful of species have been tested in AGL exper-
iments, research needs to expand to more species, to ex-
plore the strategies with which they approach various
tasks, how these compare to human strategies in the same
task, and how and why this variation arises. Among bird
species, particularly interesting candidates for such stud-
ies are corvids (songbirds) and large parrots such as
Amazon parrots. Both groups have shown cognitive abil-
ities that seem beyond those of other bird species in sev-
eral domains, such as tool use (e.g., Auersperg et al.,
2014; Taylor, Hunt, Holzhaider, & Gray, 2007), analogi-
cal reasoning (e.g., Obozova, Smirnova, Zorina, &
Wasserman, 2015; Smirnova, Zorina, Obozova, &
Wasserman, 2015), and detecting rhythmic patterns in au-
ditory stimuli (Schachner, Brady, Pepperberg, & Hauser,
2009; ten Cate, Spierings, Hubert, & Honing, 2016), all
features that require abilities for abstraction and higher-
order pattern recognition. No representatives of these
groups so far have been tested with artificial grammar
tasks. If it turns out that these or other species do have
rule-learning and abstraction abilities that are qualitatively
similar to those in humans, it would lend support to the
hypothesis that the uniqueness of language is not due to a
single, uniquely human processing mechanism. Instead,
language’s uniqueness might lie in its combination of
quantitative differences, such as a considerable quantita-
tive difference in rule-learning abilities, and the linking of
rule-learning and processing mechanisms to a sensory–
motor interface for vocal production and to a system pro-
viding meanings (semantics; Hurford, 2012).
Conclusion
To conclude, whether we consider the structure of animal
vocalizations or the animal abilities for rule learning, we have
only just begun to explore the relevant cognitive abilities and
to examine to what extent they differ between humans and
animals. There may still be much to discover before we can
draw firm conclusions regarding the uniqueness of language.
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